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APPRENDIAND ITS AFIERMATH

One result of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey2 is
that Charles Apprendi may have gained two years of freedom. Apprendi
pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm for an illegal purpose under a state
statute subjecting him to a maximum penalty of five to ten years. The trial
court then sentenced him to twelve years imprisonment when the judge

found, under a separate hate crimes sentencing enhancement statute, that
his offense-firing a gun into the home of an African-American family-had
been motivated by a purpose to intimidate the residents of the home on the
4

basis of their race.
The ground on which the Court reversed Apprendi's sentence, that the
factual findings on which the sentence was based should have been made by

ajury rather than the sentencing judge, could lead to a far more dramatic

result: a revolutionary reconstruction of our procedures for determining
guilt and punishment. As soon as Apprendi was decided, at the very end of

the October 2000 Term, commentators characterized the case as possibly
the greatest blockbuster in a term of blockbuster decisions.6 The dissenting
Justices

characterized

the decision

as

a

"watershed" rule

of criminal

procedure. 7 Talking heads and their writing counterparts predicted that,
because of Apprendi, federal criminal law would be radically remodeled,

jailhouse doors would open, and legislatures would resort to redrafting
statutes to evade the case's far-reaching consequences. 8 Some criticized the

revolutionary

regime, 9

while

others

thought

the

Court

had

acted

2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). For a detailed description of the holding, see infra text
accompanying notes 34-43.
3. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-71.
4. Id. at 471.
5. Id. at 490-97.
6. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Review: A Dramatic Change in Sentencing Practices,
TRIAL, Nov. 2000, at 102 (describing Apprendi as "one of the most important U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in years"); J. Stephen Welch, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Watershed Rulingfor the
New Milennium?, S.C. LAw, Apr. 2001, at 37 (describing Apprendi as "truly... a watershed
ruling," possibly a "dividing line," changing the direction of constitutional law for years to
come).
7. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's opinion thus
suggested that Apprendi should be applied retroactively under the standards of Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989), to allow claims of Apprendi violations to be raised in a wholesale wave
of habeas corpus petitions.
8. See NancyJ. King & Susan R. Klein, EssentialElements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1488-89
(2001) (predicting possible legislative reactions to Apprendi).
9. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty
Pleas,110YALEL.J. 1097, 1100-01 (2001).

APPRENDIAND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
appropriately as long as its actions would not upset the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 10
The apocalyptic predictions came true in part. Apprendi caused a great
flurry of activity in and around the federal courts," including a proliferation
of seminars, 12 an avalanche of pro se habeas corpus petitions and motions
for resentencing, and a steadily increasing stream of scholarly articles.
Lawyers, pro se litigants, and judges have spent many hours trying to
determine Apprendis scope.13 Most cases, however, have not resulted in
revolutionary reversals of convictions, largely because federal direct appeals
and collateral attacks bristle with defensive procedural limitations. Reading
the lower federal court cases applying Apprendi is like watching the
construction of a barricade: case after case selects from a dazzling array of
procedural excuses to explain why each particular defendant should not
reap ApprendFs benefits. The courts tell petitioners who were sentenced
before Apprendi that: (1) Apprendi is not retroactive; (2) petitioners cannot
show cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome a failure to object to their
sentence in a timely manner; 15 (3) petitioners' failure to have filed their
collateral attack within a year of sentence is fatal;16 or, (4) petitioners' failure
to have raised the new Apprendi claim in a previous petition precludes raising
the issue in a new petition.'7 If Apprendi is considered to be a "new rule" of
10. King & Klein, supranote 8, at 1483-84; AndrewJ. Fuchs, The Effect ofApprendi v. New
Jersey on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and
Elements ofa Crime, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1399, 1401-02 (2001).
11. The impact of ApprXedi on the state courts has so far been of lesser magnitude,
perhaps partly because many state legislatures have left more decisions to juries. See infra text
accompanying note 52 (describing the highly graded New York drug laws).
12. For example, in 2001, the Federal Judicial Center devoted six sessions at its
educational seminar for Federal Defenders to discussion of Apprendi issues.
13. The Administrative office does not yet have data available on Apprendis impact on the
federal docket, but searching the Westlaw federal court database for references to "Apprendi'
yielded 1723 cases.
14. See United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding Apprendi not to
be retroactive under Teague v. Lane standards); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.
2000) (same). But see Darity v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 2d 355, 363-65 (W.D.N.C. 2000)
(applying Apprendi retroactively); United States v. Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 (D.
Minn. 2000) (applying the Apprendi principle retroactively as "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" under Teague).
15. See United States v. Smith, 241 F.3d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the
defendant "procedurally defaulted his Apprendi ciaim when he failed to raise it at his trial in
1992," because the "foundation" for Apprendi claims was laid even before then); Sanders, 247
F.3d at 145-46 (same logic). But see Darity, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (questioning the applicability
of the cause and prejudice standard to a new rule made applicable under Teague, but finding
cause and prejudice).
16. Sanders, 247 F.3d at 142-44; see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (including a
one-year statute of limitations).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (allowing courts of appeal to permit filing
of a second petition if the new petition contains "a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
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constitutional law, petitioners lose because it is not retroactive. If it is not
considered "new," petitioners lose because the courts usually find that they
have defaulted on the claim. Courts tell direct appellants, who confront
fewer procedural obstacles,' 8 that Apprendi errors are harmless as long as the
sentence imposed upon them was within the statutory maximum, regardless
of how their sentence might have changed under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 19 Operating in lockstep, the courts of appeals have all but
unanimously concluded that Apprendi, despite the contrary supportive
comments of one concurring Justice 20 -and alarmed predictions of four
dissentingJustices2 -does not apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.22
To be sure, Apprendi has had a significant prospective impact, primarily

unavailable"); Tyler v. Cain, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482-85 (2001) (holding that a ruling is not
retroactive within the meaning of AEDPA unless the Supreme Court has actually found the case
to be retroactive prior to the petitioner's filing of the successive petition).
18. Although direct appellants have the benefit of the law that applies at the time of their
appeal and of the plain error rule, forgiving their failure to have raised the issue at sentencing,
application of the plain error rule has not always favored Apprendi appellants. See United States
v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the application of various facets of
the plain error rule as elaborated in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997),
including whether defendant's "substantial rights" are affected under Apprendi, or whether an
Apprendi error "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings").
19. Under some facets of the plain error rules described supra note 18, Apprendi claims
raised on appeal may be subject to harmless error analysis, as in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1
(1999), if the sentence imposed falls within the statutory maximum, see United States v. Williams,
235 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Garcia-Guizar,234 F.3d 483, 488-89 (9th Cir.
2000), or if the fact allegedly at issue was not seriously in question, see United States v. Swatzie
228 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000). Similarly, United States v. Page,232 F.3d 536, 542-45 (6th
Cir. 2000), found an Apprendi error harmless where the same sentence could have been
achieved by imposition of consecutive sentences.
20. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523 n.11 (2000) (Thomas,J., concurring).
21.
Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., & Breyer,
J.). The Apprendi majority opinion notes that this is an open question, without speculating about
how the question should be resolved. Id. at 497 n.21.
22. United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Garcia, 240
F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 862-63 (3d Cir. 2000);
United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-66 (5th Cir. 2000) (summary rejection); United
States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820,
825 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Alguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1235-36 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gerrow, 232 F.3d 831,834-35
(11th Cir. 2000) (summary rejection); see also United States v. Layeni, No. 00-3031, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29351 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 18, 2000) (per curiam) (denying certificate of appealability
in habeas case where petitioner sought to raise a claim under Apprendi but sentence did not
exceed statutory maximum).
The Fourth Circuit has had more difficulty in reaching a resolution of this issue. See
United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 200 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding the argument "colorable");
United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 121-24 (4th Cir. 2000), afd in part & re'din part, 254 F.3d
514, 517-19 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (not reaching merits because defendant had not
demonstrated plain error).

APPRENDIAND THE FEDERAL SENTEVCING GUIDELINES
in the area of federal drug prosecutions. Section 841 of Title 21 of the U.S.
Code, the principal federal drug statute, conditions penalty levels on the
quantity of drugs involved.23 Of the relatively small number of defendants
whose drug convictions were pending direct appeal when Apprendi was
24
decided, a few did have their sentences vacated. The United States, which
conceded in some cases that this statutory scheme violates Apprendi by
allowing the sentencing judge to increase sentences beyond what otherwise
would be the statutory maximum,25 began to include the drug quantity in
drug indictments.26 Apprendi also arguably applies to various other federal
27
statutes that predicate increased liability on proof of additional facts. While
these consequences are far from insignificant, if Apprendi were applied to the
28
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the result would be truly revolutionary.
In determining that Apprendi does not apply to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the lower courts had to contend with the gaping disparity

23. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994). Section 841 (b) (1) (A) prescribes a sentence of ten years to life,
§ 841(b) (1) (B) a sentence of five to forty years, and § 841(b) (1) (C) a sentence of zero to
twenty years, depending on the type and quantity of drugs possessed with intent to disseminate.
Since deciding Apprendi, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, vacated, and
remanded a number of convictions under § 841, without opinion, for reconsideration in light
of Apprendi See United States v. Norris, No. 97 CR 705-01, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5449, at *11-12
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2001) (listing representative cases); Jones v. United States, 530 U.S. 1271,
1271 (2000), remanded to United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1235-38 (10th Cir. 2000)
(reconsidering a § 841 argument after Apprendiand vacating sentence).
24. The Ninth Circuit recently held § 841(b) unconstitutional, in light of Apprend4 in
United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157, 1162-68 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'g granted, 265 F.3d 1085
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2001).
25. See United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting the
government's concession of applicability).
26. Bibas, supra note 9, at 1148-80. Because the vast majority of federal criminal
prosecutions is resolved by plea, the chief result of this change of practice may be to require
defendants at plea allocutions to describe in more detail what they are admitting to have done.
See United States v. Rebmann, 226 F.3d 521, 522-25 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing what should
have been an element of the crime under Apprendi where the defendant pled guilty).
27. See United States v. Pavelcik, No. 99-50316, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 20983 (9th Cir. Aug.
11, 2000) (unpublished decision) (granting relief under Apprendiwhere the defendant received
enhancement under a mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2326 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), for fraud
involving telemarketing); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1) (B) (1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)
(enhancing a sentence for alien smuggling if undertaken "for the purpose of commercial
advantage or private financial gain"); 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (1994) (imposing a consecutive sentence
if the offense had been committed while the defendant was released on ball); 18 U.S.C. § 2261
(1994) (increasing a sentence depending on the degree of harm to the victim of interstate
domestic violence). See generally Alan Ellis et al., Apprehending and AppreciatingApprendi, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2001, at 16, 20, 22 (listing additional federal statutes arguably covered by the
theory of ApprendO; Jon M. Sands & Steven G. Kalar, An Apprendi Primer The Virtues of a
"DoubtingThomas," CHAMPION, Oct. 2000, at 18, 23-24 (same).
28. See United States v. Norris, 143 F. Supp. 2d 243, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing
Apprendi as a "dead letter" if the courts finding the theory inapplicable to the Guidelines
prevail).
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between Apprendi's rationale and its holding. 29 The Court's decision raises
more questions than it answers about the role of the jury in fact finding and
the necessary relationship between elements of a crime and sentencing
factors. Lower courts have taken advantage of their status by remaining
within the letter of the holding, leaving the Supreme Court to decide
whether to sweep away any of the procedural barriers to postconviction
Apprendi relief and whether to apply Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Most lower courts have contented themselves with only
superficial analysis of whether the holding can logically be so limited, thus
providing the Supreme Court little assistance with the decision that will
ultimately have to be made. There is little sign of struggle, except in an
31
occasional District Court opinion. Commentators seeking to provide a
rationale for distinguishing the Guidelines have relied heavily on Justice
Breyer, whose
dissenting arguments sounded not in logic, but in
- 32
pragmatism. Applying Apprendi to the Guidelines, Breyer argued, would
undo the Guidelines' sentencing reform, and would challenge the way in
which federal courts are currently handling their criminal law business. In
other words, applying Apprendi to the Guidelines would be revolutionary,
and therefore should be avoided.
With this Article, I hope to promote a fuller discussion about whether
sentencing under the Guidelines is indeed distinguishable from the regime
that troubled the Court in Apprendi More broadly, I explore whether
Apprendi has upset or restored the proper balance between courts and
legislatures in making decisions about the criminal process, and between
judges and juries in implementing those decisions.
Apprendi is a fascinating microcosm of recent issues surrounding
constitutional interpretation. In the next section, I will describe how the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Apprendi approach the
problem of constitutional interpretation presented: when should courts
override a legislative decision about what to treat as an element of a criminal

29. See United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2000) (asserting that
Apprendi, under Justice Thomas's rationalization, should apply to increases in potential
sentence under the Guidelines, but adhering to the literal holding); see also Bibas, supra note 9,
at 1147-48 (agreeing with Justice Thomas that Apprendi's rationale undermines the choices
made in the Guidelines); infra text accompanying notes 34-43 (discussing disparity between
Apprend's rationale and its literal holding).
30. See cases cited supra note 22.
31. Norris, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Norris, No. 97 CR 70501, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5449 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2001) (Nickerson,J.).
32. King & Klein, supra note 8, at 1483-84; Fuchs, supra note 10, at 1419-26. Others have
agreed with Justice Thomas and concluded that the Guidelines are not distinguishable. Bibas,
supranote 9, at 1148-49.
33. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555-66 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that the real world of criminal justice "can function only with the help of
procedural compromises, particularly in respect to sentencing").

APPRENDIAND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
offense and what to treat as a sentencing factor? All three opinions seem to
assume that an unequivocal answer to this question can be found in history,
although their versions of history's answers differ starkly. As I explain, the
history of how the guilt and punishment phases have been treated
throughout American history does not settle the question of whether the
Apprendi holding should be extended to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
under which significant increases in punishment are effected by sentencing
judges operating on a standard of proof less rigorous than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. I then discuss an alternative approach to this question,
looking to the historical role and function of the jury. The true center of the
debates in Apprendi is whether or not the jury will be empowered to serve as
a meaningful second locus of democratic input in the criminal justice
system, even if that prospect disadvantages criminal defendants. Finally, I
discuss the reason why the Court is unlikely to apply Apprendi to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines regardless of what history might show or what juries
should be permitted to decide: the Court's continuing adherence to a
positivist view of the liberty of anyone convicted of a crime. This misguided
approach, although not surfacing in any of the Apprendi opinions, has
enabled the Court to avoid decisions that would upset legislative will in
other areas and threatens to do the same here.
II. THE FUTURE SCOPE OFAPPRENDI: HOLDINGVS. RATIONALE
A.

APPRENDI AND TiE EDERAL SENTENCING GWEU.NE

According to Justice Stevens's majority opinion, expanding Apprendi's
sentence by two years beyond the original statutory maximum was
unconstitutional because it increased the prosecutor's entitlement beyond
the original charge. 34 Therefore, Apprendi should have been entitled to
have the precipitating fact-that his crime was motivated by racial
intimidation-found by a jury, operating under a standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.35 The Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and the
due process right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt trump the state
legislature's intent to have the precipitating fact (racial intimidation) found
by a judge as part of the sentencing decision. As Justice Stevens explained,
quoting his own concurring opinion the previous year in Jones v. United
States:..6 "[I] t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed."3' Similarly, the legislature cannot avoid the
Due Process Clause's requirement that all "elements" of a crime be proven

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 491-97.
Id. at 490.
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (quotingJones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Stevens,J., concurring)).
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beyond a reasonable doubt 8 by relegating proof of some of those elements
to sentencing, where a lesser standard of proof may be employed. 39
The actual holding of Apprendi is more limited than some of the
statements made in its support would suggest: "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."40 Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, defended the
broader proposition that the statutory maximum should not matter. Any
aggravating fact, Thomas maintained, that "is by law a basis for imposing or
increasing punishment," should be subject to the Apprendi rationale. 4 1 As
Justice O'Connor's dissent noted, Justice Thomas's formulation would
almost certainly call into question the constitutionality of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which subdivide the sentencing consequences of
conviction under each statute by creating a series of narrow sentencing
ranges, with the appropriate range to be selected depending on facts found
42
by the sentencing judge. These sentencing factors, like the enhancement
in Apprendi, can be described as providing a basis for imposing or increasing
43
punishment.
The facts of United States v. Meshack,44 one of the first cases finding
Apprendi inapplicable to the Guidelines, provide a typical example of the
operation of the Guidelines. In that case, a jury convicted defendant
Thomas of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. 45 The
available sentencing range under § 841 was from zero to twenty years. 46 At
sentencing, the judge decided, over the defendant's objection, that the
relevant quantity of drugs involved was 245.73 grams, placing defendant's
crime at base offense level thirty-four and resulting in a sentence of 168
months.47 The judge, not the jury, made the finding on this disputed fact
without the benefit of trial rules of evidence and on a reduced standard of
38. See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 374 (1970) (requiring the prosecution to convince the
finder of fact of all essential elements of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
39. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id at 501 (Thomas,J, concurring).
42. Id. at 544 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
43. For a discussion of the counterargument that the Guidelines do not "increase"
punishment because defendant has already been convicted of a crime entitling the government
to the maximum amount of time provided under the statute of conviction, see infra text
accompanying notes 121-47.
44. 225 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000).
45. Id. at 565.
46. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 841(b) (1) (C) (1994).
47. Meshack, 225 F.3d at 565-66. Had the judge found a smaller quantity, the resulting base
offense level might have prescribed a sentence shorter by years. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.l(c) (1994) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (Drug Quantity Table and
Sentencing Table at § 5A) (listing the Guidelines range for various quantities of controlled
substances).

APPRENADI AND TI
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proof. 48 The defendant did not win resentencing after Apprendi, however,
because his Guidelines sentence was within the maximum of the applicable
statute.49
Unlike the NewJersey legislature in its hate crime legislation, Congress
did not itself decide how to treat drug quantity, the relevant sentencing
factor here. Congress delegated the authority to structure sentencing
decisions to the United States Sentencing Commission, a body created to be
politically insulated. 5° Shortly after the Guidelines were enacted, I asked why,
given the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines' new narrow focus on
offense-related factors, it was necessary or appropriate to treat factors like
drug quantity as sentencing factors rather than as elements of the offense.51
In New York, by way of contrast, drug laws are graded according to the
type and quantity of drug involved in a defendant's offense.52 The jury is
asked to decide the relevant drug quantity as an element of the offense,
using the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and thereby
circumscribes the range of possible punishment. No one in the federal
system ever really took responsibility for deciding whether treating drug
quantity as an element would have been preferable to the Sentencing
Commission's drug quantity table. The Sentencing Commission, having
been delegated only the power to structure sentencing discretion, did not
have the power to rewrite the underlying criminal law itself. Therefore, it
had no need to discuss which of the facts in question could more
appropriately have been treated as elements of the underlying offense, or
what factual determinations jurors could handle. Congress showed by its
delegation, and the decision not to review the Sentencing Commission's
initial work, that it had either too
little will or too much self-knowledge to
54
rewrite the federal criminal code.

48. See Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the
FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 295-99 (1992)
[hereinafter Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog] (describing how lowered standards of proof
at sentencing are considered constitutionally permissible and critiquing this result).
49. Meshack, 225 F.3d at 576-77.
50. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-412 (1989) (holding that the creation
of the hybrid Sentencing Commission did not violate separation of powers principles).
51. See Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog supranote 48, at 289, 295-99 (discussing the
Guidelines' treatment of drug quantity as a sentencing factor).
52. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00-.65, 221.00-.55 (McKinney 2001); see Susan N. Herman,
MeasuringCulpability by MeasuringDrugs?: Three Reasons to Reevaluate the Rockefeller DrugLaws, 63
AIB. L. REv. 777 (2000) (discussing New York's exclusive focus on drug quantity and type as a
grading device).
53. Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searchingforthe "Tailof the Dog": Finding "Elements"
of Crimes in the Wake ofMcMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEALE U. L. REV. 1057,1061 n.21 (1999).
54. There are several ways in which disputes about drug quantity, now decided by the
sentencing judge, arise under the Sentencing Guidelines. First, defendants are sentenced not
just for the conduct for which they have been convicted, but for their "real offense." SeeU.S.S.G.
§ IB1.3(a) (1) (1994) (addressing the relevant conduct within a charged offense); § 1B1.3(a) (2)
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In any event, even if Congress intended to make drug quantity a
sentencing factor rather than an element of the offense, this intent would be
of no greater constitutional consequence than the New Jersey legislature's
decision to have judges decide on the existence of a purpose to intimidate.
The central question is whether the Guidelines escape Apprendi's
constitutional rule because the sentencing ranges provided operate within a
preexisting statutory maximum sentence. While it seems likely that Justice
Thomas would conclude that the Guidelines "increase punishment," it is not
clear how many other members of the five-Justice majority would agree to
this formulation. Justice Scalia quite pointedly refused to join the section of
Thomas's concurrence where the rationale supporting this position is set
forth. 5 So far, there has been a majority only for the more limited holding,
making the statutory maximum the ceiling of Apprendi's reach.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor attacked the majority's holding as an
illogical and formalistic compromise. If the Court is willing to second-guess
legislative decisions about allocation of fact finding, O'Connor asked, what
reason is there to distinguish between facts that aggravate a punishment
beyond a statutory maximum and facts that aggravate a punishment within a
statutory maximum, or even facts that mitigate a punishment?56 She
observed that the NewJersey legislature could achieve the result they sought
in their enhancement statute without violating the Court's holding by
(addressing discrete acts or omissions); § A4(a) (explaining the modified real-offense
approach); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REv. 403 (1993) (critiquing the Guidelines' real-offense
approach). In United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531, 1532-35 (6th Cir. 1989), for example, a
defendant was sentenced on the basis of possession of one kilogram of cocaine rather than the
quarter ounce alleged and proven at trial. The decision about whether a defendant is
sufficiently connected with a shipment of drugs to justify holding defendant culpable for the
entire shipment, as opposed to just the amount the defendant has actually sold or disseminated,
might be decided differently by a jury reflecting community mores rather than a judge, who
presumably manifests a professional viewpoint.
Second, sometimes there is doubt about the quantity of drugs involved in a
defendant's own activity. See United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1179-81 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990) (describing a sentencing hearing in which the judge determined
the relevant quantity of drugs by referring to a transcript of the testimony of a witness at the
earlier trial of the defendant's brother); see also Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog supranote
48, at 354 n.270 (describing a drug trial where the government had inspected some but not all
of the electrical tape-wrapped packets of drugs that the defendant was found to have smuggled
and then derived the quantity on which sentencing would be based by extrapolating and
multiplying the quantity found in the inspected packages). This casual approach was later
questioned by the Second Circuit, which held in UnitedStates v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085, 1090-93
(2d Cir. 1997), that specific evidence of drug quantity is required before a defendant is
sentenced under a guideline setting penalties on the basis of that quantity.
Some of these creative techniques of establishing drug quantity, thought to pass
muster under the looser standard of proof applied at sentencing, might well fail to provide
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
55. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
56. Id. at 542-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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shuffling a few words. They could simply redraft their statute to set one
maximum penalty for possession of a firearm, and then provide that, within
that maximum, only those defendants found by a judge at sentencing to
have acted with a purpose to intimidate on the basis of race would be
eligible to receive a sentence greater than ten years.57 At least for the
purposes of her dissent, Justice O'Connor joined Justice Thomas in
believing that the statutory maximum should not be dispositive, especially
when it creates such a malleable line. However, she also
resisted Thomas's
58
attempts to defend his own rule on the basis of history.
B. APPRENDI AND THE TECHNIQUES OF CONSTrTUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

1. The History of Sentencing Discretion
The range of viewpoints in the Apprendi opinions demonstrates that
invoking our collective traditions and common law practice as a basis for
constitutional interpretation is not a simple or objective enterprise. Not only
did the Justices bicker about sources (Is the third or fourth edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries the superior reference? How are the treatises of
Archbold and Bishop to be read?),59 but they also disagreed on methodology
(Must a source date from the eighteenth century to count as relevant
history?). 6° Justice Thomas claimed that common law history supported his
broad rule;r 1 Justice O'Connor claimed that it did not, although without
providing a counter-history.62 Justice Stevens used history to defend only the
holding's narrower proposition.6 These three accounts of history result in a
stand-off with respect to the broader question of how far the holding might
extend. One might agree with O'Connor's statement that "the history cited
by Thomas does not require, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the
application of the rule he advocates," and at the same time agree with
Thomas's statement, "I am aware of no historical basis for treating as a
nonelement a fact that by law sets or increases punishment."65 In other
words, history does not settle the argument.
The common law cannot provide a conclusive answer to the procedural

57. Id.
58. Id. at 527 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g, id. at 479 n.6 ("ETihe principle dissent would chide us for this... citation to
Blackstone's third volume, rather than to his fourth ... ."); id at 481 n.8 (noting that the
dissents take issue with the Court's reliance on Archbold).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69 (describing the historical debate between
Thomas and O'Connor).
61. Apprend4 530 U.S. at 521 (Thomas,J, concurring).
62. I&at 527 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 479-82.
64. Id. at 527-28 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
65. Id. at 521 (ThomasJ, concurring).
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question of how to divide the roles of judge and jury with respect to
determinations of guilt and punishment because the substantive questions
asked ofjudge and jury have fluctuated over time and place. First, the nature
of crime itself, particularly of federal crime, has expanded dramatically.
While it may be possible to measure today's homicide law against homicide
law as it existed at the framing of the Constitution, 66. it is not so simple to
measure today's federal regulatory and drug offenses against common-law
counterparts. It is often the case that no true parallels exist.
Second, as sentencing philosophies have shifted, so have the relative
roles of the sentencing judge and jury. Courts trying to capture the criminal
justice tradition of the federal government and the states in one snapshot
called "tradition" are like the fabled blind men trying to describe an
elephant: the picture depends on what part of history is being observed, and
the nature of criminal justice policy in that time and place.
Justice Thomas, arguing for the broad rule that courts may require
legislatively designated sentencing enhancements to be treated as elements
of the offense, cited cases from the mid-nineteenth century that, he
contended, rejected legislative attempts to funnel significant fact-finding to
the sentencingjudge. justice O'Connor protested that these cases were not
contemporaneous with the framing of the Constitution, and therefore did
not count.6 Thomas rejoined that the legislatures did not create such
sentencing enhancements during the eighteenth century, and so the courts
had no opportunity to make such rulings at the earlier date. He nevertheless
believed they obviously would have done so had the occasion arisen. 69 The
difficulty for an originalist is deciding whether these rulings should count in
interpreting the Due Process Clause.
The relative roles of courts and legislatures in setting sentencing policy
have also varied substantially. Justice O'Connor argued that, at various
points in history, judges have been permitted to find the facts on which
sentence is based-even offense-related facts-and, therefore, concluded
that there is no basis for voiding legislative decisions about
• • 70 when to allocate
such fact-finding to sentencing judges rather than juries. Why should it be
unconstitutional, she asked, for a legislature merely to codify sentencing

66. See generally Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (analyzing whether the Due
Process Clause, in light of the history of homicide law, prohibits a legislature from shifting the
burden of proof on a mitigating fact in a homicide statute); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of a mitigating fact in a homicide prosecution, and prohibiting the use of

presumptions).
67. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 502 (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to mid-nineteenth
century cases).
68. Id at 527-28 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
69. Id.at 502 n.2 (Thomas,J., concurring).
70. Id. at 553-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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discretion, and to tell judges how much weight to give various factors? 7' The
history underlying her reasoning, however, consisted of a citation to a
commentary referring to early sentencing discretion afforded federal
judges,72 and another alluding to "the age of broad judicial sentencing
discretion," without pinning down the limits of that age, or attempting to
canvass the activities of state courts and legislatures. 73
On the other hand, Justice Stevens's historical response, thatjuries have
always decided facts that increase punishment beyond the statutory
maximum (an argument O'Connor dismissed as based on questionable
sources), 74 is sufficient only to anchor the narrow holding of Apprendi.75
Dipping into the argument between Thomas and O'Connor, Stevens
observed that at common law before and immediately after the Constitution
was drafted, statutes tended to be sanction specific and so the courts
possessed little explicit sentencing discretion. 76 But Justice Stevens also
announced that this history hardly proves that sentencing discretion is
impermissible, citing a twentieth-century case, decided during the heyday of
indeterminate sentencing, which allowed sentencing judges to make
decisions with few procedural safeguards. 77 He did not attempt to reconcile
these two observations, which seem to point in different directions, a
problem if "history" must bear one consistent message. Instead, Stevens
acknowledged that our recognition of judges' sentencing discretion has
been "periodic. " 7s He did not attempt to isolate those periods relevant to a
constitutional historical analysis. This lack of historical precision was less
significant in Apprendi, where there was no real challenge to Stevens's
assertion that judges have never been allowed to select sentences above the
applicable statutory maximum, than it will be when the Court is called upon
to decide whether Apprendi applies to the Guidelines.
Does history suggest that the Guidelines may appropriately be
characterized as a mere codification of traditional sentencing discretion,

71. Id. at544-50.
72. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544-45.
73.
Id. at 545; see KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1998) (contrasting the broad discretion afforded
federal judges during the early years of our nation with state courts, where juries often
exercised sentencing authority).
74. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 526, 481 n.8 (setting forth O'Connor's attack and Stevens's
defense); Bibas, supra note 9, at 1123-28 (siding with O'Connor). But see King & Klein, supra
note 8, at 1477-85 (siding with Stevens).
75. See King & Klein, supra note 8, at 1471-85 (approving Stevens's use of history to
support the holding).
76. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479-80.
77. See id. at 481-82 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)); Herman, The Tail
that Wagged the Dog supra note 48, at 317-21 (exploring the extent to which the rationale of
WXlliams depends on the context of indeterminate sentencing).
78. Apprend 530 U.S. at 481.
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thereby escaping Apprendfs preference for jury determination of facts on
which punishment will be based? Thomas's and O'Connor's accounts are no
more conclusive than Stevens's dabs of history. 79 Some lower court judges,
trying to apply Apprendi, have described judicial discretion in sentencing as
"traditional," but have not tried to establish how deep the roots of this
tradition might be.80 Although federal judges just before the advent of the
Guidelines were permitted to find facts on which sentences might be based,
including offense-related facts like drug quantity, this level of judicial
discretion in sentencing has not been a consistent tradition.
My own review of the history ofjudicial discretion in sentencing has led
me to conclude that the Guidelines amounted to a significant break with
preceding practices, rather than a mere codification of what judges had
been deciding on an individual basis. 8 1 Before the nineteenth century, there
was relatively little room for separate discretionary decisions with respect to
sentencing. 82 The questions of guilt and punishment became sharply
bifurcated during the nineteenth century, when the notion of adopting a
medical model of punishment came into vogue and generated greater use of
indeterminate sentencing.8 3 The role of sentencer began to grow and
diverge from the role of fact-finder at trial as courts were obliged to consider
additional matters in the context of the new, predictive sentencing decision
that would not have been relevant or appropriate to consider during the
trial phase. 4 Sentencing began to focus more on the offender, while the
trial continued to focus on the offense.
Judicial discretion has been "traditional" only when and where the
prevailing philosophy of punishment left room for significant second stage
decisions. In some instances, as in federal court before the advent of the
Guidelines, judges essentially had discretion to select their own sentencing
philosophy. 85 They could choose whether to impose a heavier sentence
based on what they perceived to be the harm done by the defendant, or
based on what they perceived to be the equities in the defendant's personal
situation. Under this bifurcated decision-making process, if the judge could

79. See Bibas, supranote 9, at 1128-33 (criticizing Thomas's use of history).
80. See United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2001) (referring to
sentencingjudges' "traditional" authority to decide facts relevant to sentence).
81. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog,supranote 48, at 300-04.
82. Id.
83. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481-82 (describing the shift in sentencing philosophy during
the nineteenth century); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 73, at 17-18 (explaining that the
rehabilitative model required deferring decisions about length of incarceration to parole
authorities).
84. See Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog, supranote 48, at 302-03.
85. Federal statutes provided only a maximum sentence and thus allowed judges to choose
whether to sentence on the basis of the circumstances of the offense, the offender's history or
personal characteristics, or a combination of both. See STITH & CABRANES supra note 73, at 9-11
(noting that federaljudges had wide discretion).
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choose what facts are relevant to sentencing, a jury could not make the
relevant factual determinations during trial. Personal questions about the
offender's past or future, like prior criminal history, could not appropriately
be injected into a proceeding to determine guilt. Questions relating to the
offense, like the precise quantity of drugs involved, might not matter,
depending on the individual judge's predilections. With the Guidelines's
choice of sentencing philosophy and renewed focus on the offense itself,
there was less reason to save offense-related factors for the sentencing judge.
The Guidelines tell us that precise drug quantity is relevant to sentencing so,
as in New York, the pre-Guidelines
reason for reserving this determination
86
for sentencing no longer exists.

Justice Thomas's opinion proceeds as if the entirety of history can be
condensed into one uniform account of our collective American traditions
with respect to sentencing.87 The division of authority between federal
judges and juries, as well as federal judges and Congress, has certainly varied
over time. Sentencing traditions have been no more uniform over place.
Justice Thomas tried to draw a picture of what the state courts have done,
for example, in recounting his history of the common law of sentencing. 88
But state legislatures may, and do, differ from their courts, from one
another, and sometimes from their own predecessors, on the issue of how
separate the sentencing phase should be, and what its subject matter should
include. States might choose to follow New York's approach of making drug
quantity an element; they might choose to adopt sentencing guidelines; or
they might retain a discretionary model of sentencing and continue to allow
sentencing judges to choose not only the sentence for a drug offender, but
the philosophical basis for that sentence. As the above discussion illustrates,
a one-size-fits-all account of history is likely to be either myopic or
misleading.
Basing a constitutional rule on the historical dominance during certain
periods of time of one philosophy of sentencing deprives state legislatures of
free choice in adopting sentencing policies, perhaps unnecessarily.
Sentencing judges had substantial freedom to choose their own sentencing
philosophies when legislatures did not do so.89 Today's legislatures often
choose to preempt decisions about appropriate bases for sentencing. Just
because some legislatures, at some points in time, delegated sentencing
philosophy to judges should not mean that they must be required to

86. There may be practical reasons for wishing to defer decisions on aggravating factors to
sentencing. See infra text accompanying notes 117-19, for a discussion of those reasons.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69 (describing Thomas's approach to commonlaw cases).
88. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 503 (ThomasJ, concurring).
89. See STrTH & CABRANEs, supra note 73, at 23 (noting that no real "common law" of
sentencing developed because sentencing was not even subject to appellate review, and so
sentencing priorities were set by individual judges).
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continue whatever patterns their courts then chose. Any limit on the ability
of the legislatures to enhance the role of the judge at the expense of the jury
should be derived not from what sentencing judges have done in the past
(often without examination of the constitutionality of their actions), but, as
the next section will argue, on whatjuries should be permitted to do.
2.

The History ofJury Trial: Toward a Functional Approach

By its holding, the Apprendi majority declared that the Constitution does
not allow legislatures the last word in making policy decisions that result in
reducing the role of the jury. Ironically, it then formulated a holding that
allows the legislature the last word. Part of Justice Thomas's argument from
history was based on descriptions of lower court decisions taking an active
role in maintaining the jury's power. 90 But as Justice O'Connor pointed out,
the Supreme Court itself had traditionally ceded such decisions to
legislatures. 91 Until the last few years of the twentieth century, in fact, the
only case in which the Court had even considered whether there should be
any constitutional limitation on the prerogatives of legislatures2 to designate
elements and sentencing factors was McMillan v. Pennsylvania.
In the statutory scheme at issue in McMillan, sentencing judges,
operating on a lesser standard of proof, decided whether or not defendants
were armed during the commission of their offense. 93 A mandatory
minimum sentence followed an affirmative finding. The Court's
constitutional analysis focused almost exclusively on the due process
question of whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt of this fact was
required, even when considering whether this fact should have been treated
as an element. 94 The Court ruled that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was
not constitutionally required, although it left room for an exception if
sentencing 95 decisions became the "tail which wag[ged] the dog" of
conviction.

Even if proof beyond a reasonable doubt were required at a sentencing
hearing,96 the jury would be left out. Apprendi is notable for putting
90.

See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's historical

analysis).

91.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 529-39 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).

92. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). For a full discussion of the other Supreme Court cases leading up
to Apprendi, see Bibas, supra note 9, at 1102-15.

93.
94.

477 U.S. at 81-82.
Id. at 84-93.

95. Id. at 88. Ironically, given the legislature's ability to overcome Apprendi, McMillan's
exception could in the long run turn out to be the more reliable protection against a willful or
cost-conscious legislature.
96. The exception McMillan provides has not been held to require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, even in extreme cases. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.3d 1084, 1101
(3d Cir. 1990) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence of facts found at sentencing
that had the effect of increasing the defendant's Guidelines range from a maximum of thirty-
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questions about the role of the jury at the center of the debate. In McMillan,
the right to jury trial is not mentioned by either the majority or dissent.
Another way of supporting Thomas's thesis would be to interpret the
history of the Sixth Amendment as creating a presumption thatjuries should
be permitted to decide any facts leading to increasing or imposing
punishment, unless there is a compelling reason why the jury cannot be
asked to make a particular decision at trial.97 This somewhat functional
approach would treat history on a more generalized level, rather than trying
to forge federal and state court case law into one historical imperative. It
would examine past allocations of decision-making authority for their
soundness rather than their consistency.
It is by now a commonplace that over the last two centuries juries have
lost much of their initial constitutional power.98 Nevertheless, in a variety of
recent cases, the current Court has exalted the jury as a second locus of
citizen participation in the justice system. In the Batson?9 line of cases, for
example, the Court has been more concerned with the right of prospective
jurors to play their civic role than with the impact of jury selection on
defendants. 100 In these and other cases, like Singer v. United States, 101 the
Court has promoted the power of the jury as a representative of the
community, and not necessarily as a benefit for individual defendants. In
Singer, the Court decided that defendants who do not wish to have a trial by
jury have no constitutional right to make that choice if the prosecution does
not concur.10 2 Either party may require ajury trial to legitimate the outcome.
In all of these cases, the Court has treated the right to a jury trial as part of
the Constitution's prescribed structure for decision-making, rather than as a
defendant's prerogative.
Since very few cases today actually go to jury trial, 10 3 Professor Bibas
deplores the attention that courts and commentators extend to the role of
three months, to 360 months).
97. For a discussion of what reasons might justify deferring factual determinations to
sentencing see infra text accompanying notes 117-19.
98.
SeeJEFFREYABRAMSON, WE, THEJURY: THEJURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
89-90(1994) (arguing that as the jury has been democratized, it has lost much of its power).

99. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor must justify
peremptory challenge of prospective juror with a race-neutral reason). For a discussion of the
cases expanding on Batson, see Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: RepresentationReinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL L. REV. 1807, 1813-14 (1993) [hereinafter
Herman, Batson] (describing post-Batson cases).
100. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (describingiury service as a contribution
to civic life, rather than as a procedural protection for defendants); Herman, Batson, supranote
99, at 1813-14, 1829-41.
101.
380 U.S. 24 (1965).
102. Id. at 34-36 (upholding federal rule requiring prosecutor's consent to a jury trial
waiver).
103. See Bibas, supra note 9, at 1150 (estimating that fewer than four percent of felony
defendants have jury trials).
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thejury. 0 4 But the Court's appraisal of the significance of the jury's role has
more validity than Professor Bibas allows. Although jury trials are relatively
rare in practice, the prosecutors' and defense attorneys' estimation of how a
jury might decide a case becomes the benchmark against which plea
bargaining takes place. Where both sides agree in their estimation, a bargain
is struck. It is in cases where the two sides have different expectations of a
jury-perhaps because there is a serious disagreement about the facts, or
perhaps because of a perceived prospect of jury nullification in the case of
an unpopular law or a popular defendant-that a trial will occur. It may be
that the jury plays its most crucial role in such contentious cases. But the jury
also plays a role in the system even when it is not convened. Even ifjury trials
are not in common usage, they set a gold standard of value. Gold does not
become worthless because we use paper money in our daily commerce.
The true center of the debate Apprendi reopens is not just about how to
parcel out the roles of judge and jury, but how to allocate the power of
citizen participation in the criminal justice process between the legislature
and the jury. Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein, who fear legislative
overreaction to Apprend, nevertheless argue that courts should keep the
weight of Apprendi to a minimum in order to allow for "robust democratic
debate" in the legislatures.'0 5 But treating the legislature as the only locus of
democratic participation conveniently ignores the jury's role in the
constitutional scheme as another occasion for democratic input.10 6
Legislatures are a fairly professionalized and indirect vehicle of citizen
participation. Sometimes they are the very generators of the law against
which citizens may want protection. 0 7 juries are the democracy of last resort.
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens speculated that the holding of
Apprendi will make legislative decisions transparent. It will become obvious
that in setting their statutory maximum sentences, legislatures are also
allocating power between judges or juries, and this transparency will,
according to Justice Stevens, provide sufficient political accountability so
that courts may then defer to legislative decisions about what sentencing
judges are to do.10 Against the background of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the idealistic notion that legislatures engage in robust and
informed debate on allocating sentencing factors and elements of crime
appears to be a greater myth than the Hollywood notion ofjury trials that

104. MId
at 1100, 1149-52.
105. King & Klein, supranote 8, at 1481.
106. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1183-99
(1991) (describing the jury's prominent role in the original scheme of the Constitution).
107. Justice O'Connor credits the jury with providing protection against overzealous
prosecutors and judges, but never includes the legislature on the list of those who might
overreach. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 547-48 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 490 n.16.
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Professor Bibas debunks. 1° Congress created the United States Sentencing
Commission, a politically insulated body, 110 precisely because federal
representatives evidently believed themselves incapable of rational and
informed debate on sentencing policy. It is ironic that so many lower courts
are applying the Apprendi dissenters' call for deference to legislative
decisions about what should be sentencing factors so off-handedly to
maintain the balance of power under the Guidelines. After all, interposing
the Sentencing Commission completely changed the balance of political
accountability in the federal criminal law.111
The Guidelines take a double bite out of democracy. First, they reduce
legislative accountability. Then they minimize jury participation, despite the
fact that the theory of punishment reflected focuses more on the offense
than the offender, which could allow the jury to play a greater role. Justice
O'Connor's argument for legislative deference, therefore, is better suited to
the legislature involved in Apprendi. The NewJersey state legislature, at least,
the fact found in Apprendi's case
evidently decided quite consciously to make
11 2
a sentencing factor and not an element.
The jury is also at the center of the debate in Apprendi in that observers'
views about how great a role the jury must be allowed to play seem to
correlate with their level of confidence
113in jurors. Justice Breyer, a member of
• •
the original Sentencing Commission, claimed that most of the factors on
which the Guidelines base sentences are too sophisticated and complex for
jurors to apply.11 4 He did not take issue with the history or logic of Justice
Thomas's argument that the Constitution should be understood to assign
more decision-making power to jurors, but argued that such a principle
must sometimes, as in the case of the Guidelines, give way to pragmatism
and compromise.115 Professor Bibas, echoing this idea, noted that Apprendi,
even if taken no further than its holding, is likely to disadvantage
defendants.11 6 In other words, both argue for interpreting Apprendi narrowly

109. Professor Bibas is dismissive of Stevens's reliance on the prospect of political
accountability. Bibas, supra note 9, at 1136-39. King and Klein are sympathetic to Stevens's
notion. King & Klein, supranote 8, at 1486-87, 1489.
110. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368-69 (describing the features and
method of appointing the Commission).
111. See id. at 422-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that by lodging sentencing policy
decisions in the judicial branch, Congress violated the separation of powers).
112. See Knoll & Singer, supra note 53, at 1061 n.21 (arguing that the fact that Congress did
not formally adopt the Guidelines means that they should not be treated as legislation for
purposes of analyzing an offense's elements).
113. See STrT- & CABRANES, supra note 73, at 49-50, for an account of Breyer's
appointment.
114. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 557-58 (2000) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
115. This approach is defended in Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRAL. REV. 1, 8-31 (1988).
116. Bibas, supranote 9, at 1143-45.
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in order to save defendants from jury decision-making.
Justice Breyer may have been right in maintaining that the professionals
of the Sentencing Commission and the bench would make wiser decisions
than legislators and juries, but taking this point of view to the extreme of
minimizing the jury's role is in tension with the Constitution's persistent
choice of democratic decision-making.1 1 7 Justice Breyer's pragmatic
approach overgeneralizes and, in the name of protecting defendants against
poor jury decisions, prevents defendants from preferring juries. A
presumption allowing juries to decide offense-related facts might be
overcome in circumstances where there really is a pragmatic reason to defer
a factual decision to sentencing-if the facts to be decided at trial would
prove particularly prejudicial to a defendant in a particular case, for
example-or perhaps if the defendant preferred to waive a jury decision.
Most offender-related characteristics, including the prior convictions for
which the Court has already allowed an exception to Apprendi n 8 would fall
into this category and therefore might appropriately be deferred to
sentencing. 9
A second circumstance that might overcome a presumption in favor of
juror fact finding might be where a legislature has made a legitimate policy
choice respecting sentencing that inherently requires giving judges a greater
role. For example, a state legislature might disagree with Congress's decision
to select its own sentencing philosophy and wish instead to allow politically
insulated judges to decide for themselves, in individual cases, what factors
should be relevant to sentencing. The Guidelines make an extreme set of
choices against democracy for the sake of a particular criminal justice
philosophy. Perhaps there is room for a state legislature to make a different
20
choice.

1

117. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the Constitution as
favoring a more robust role for the jury).
118. There is, of course, considerable doubt about the continued validity of AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the case that inspired this exception. See Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 489-90 (expressing doubts about the correctness of the Almendarez-Torres decision);
id. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., concurring) (regretting his "error" as the fifth and decisive vote in
AIlnendarez-Torres).
119. Deferring decisions to the sentencing phase does not, of course, require giving those
decisions to the judge.Jury decision-making could be bifurcated, as in capital cases. Discussing
the feasibility of such a procedure is beyond the scope of this Article.
120. This idea may simply be another way to restate the Apprendi question, but it is more
consistent with the Court's treatment of legislative policy determinations in previous cases than
the actual holding in Apprendi. See infra text accompanying notes 121-47 (comparing the Court's
treatment of legislative policy decisions in other cases with Apprendi).
In suggesting, while stopping short of fully endorsing, novel lines to govern
interpretation of the right to trial byjury, I recognize that I am not being solicitous of some of
the Court's recent precedents. For example, Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998),
concluded that a sentencing judge may determine the type and quantity of drugs at a
sentencing hearing as long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the applicable statutory
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In any event, the line drawn by the Apprendi holding does not have any
relationship to the question of what jurors can or should decide, either as a
matter of history or as a functional analysis. Empowering jurors to find facts
only where legislatures have drafted their statutes in one particular way
(providing two different statutes grading drug offenses) and not if they have
drafted them in another way (providing one statutory ceiling) cannot fairly
be understood as returning to a traditional American practice rooted in our
collective history and customs, or to our original understanding of the
significance and competence of juries. If the Court decides to dig in at the
line of the holding in Apprendi, that decision will be attributable to another
recent theory of constitutional interpretation not debated in the Apprendi
opinions-a positivist approach to rights most familiar from the Court's
procedural due process cases.
3.

Hybrid Rights-Partial Legislative Deference

One of the Court's favored approaches to defining rights in recent
decades has been to declare itself in partnership with legislatures in the
creation of constitutional rights. This positivist

approach carves out some

space for judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions, but allows
legislatures to make the critical value judgments by deciding whether or not
to create "entitlements." Attemping to avoid the extremes of judicial
subjectivity on the one hand and abdication on the other, the Court treats
legislative policy decisions as a condition precedent for rights-creation and
then applies modest doses of judicial power to implement the rights
allegedly generated by democratic decision. A paradigmatic example of this
technique is the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee that no one may be deprived of "life, liberty or property without
due process of law."1 22 The Court might have held that this language

maximum. Id. at 515. Edwards makes it more difficult to argue that the division of decisionmaking under the Guidelines is unconstitutional.
Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein have proposed a modest multifactor test to
review legislation for Apprendi violations, designed to nestle within the Court's precedents. See
King & Klein, supranote 8, at 153544 (articulating standards). I regard many of the precedents
they try to accommodate as overly deferential to legislative decisions, and so I am not
attempting to weave them into my analysis.
121. In a previous article, I described and critiqued the Burger Court's positivist approach
to the liberty interests of prisoners and how that approach was derived from procedural due
process cases concerning property. Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The ProceduralDue Process
Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482 (1984) [hereinafter
Herman, The New Liberty]. That article, defining "positivism" as the specific acts of legislators
and administrators, id-at 484 n.2, examined the notion that positive law creates "entitlements"
to property and liberty by establishing criteria for decision-making and thus limiting the
discretion of administrative officials. The article discusses whether this linkage between
procedure and discretion might be understood as serving values of fairness, efficiency, or
democracy. Id. at 543-55.

122.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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requires state and federal governmental actors to provide procedural
safeguards before depriving an individual of any significant form of wealth
or freedom.1 23 But instead of deciding for itself what forms of wealth or
freedom are significant, the Court left that evaluative part of the decisionmaking process to elected officials, holding that the Due Process Clause only
applies to governmental actors if the state has created an "entitlement" to
property or liberty by limiting the discretion of the relevant decision-making
officials. 124 If state positive law creates such an entitlement, then courts will
wield the Due Process Clause to mandate an appropriate level of process,
regardless of the legislature's procedural specifications.
On the other
hand, if state officials reserve the right to make discretionary decisions, no
constitutional right to due process exists because no entitlement has been
created. I have previously explained this series of cases as the Court's
attempt to defer value judgments about which decisions are important
enough to warrant expenditures of time and money to democratically
elected officials. 126 If the Court deems this judgment to have been made by
elected officials, the Court then demands
considers to be appropriate
_what it127
procedural protection under the circumstances.
Similarly, the Court has held that the protections of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits being put twice in
jeopardy for the same "offense,"1 28 depend on a legislative definition of what
constitutes an offense.129 The Court has chosen not to enlist the Double
Jeopardy Clause to limit the actions of state or federal legislatures in
deciding what to define as two separate offenses.13 0 But if the Court deems
the legislature to have created two separate offenses on the basis of how the
elements of the offenses are defined and arrayed, the legislature cannot
13 1
then authorize that those "same" offenses be tried or punished twice.
Ultimately, the procedural consequence rests on a legislative choice.
Sixth Amendment rights have also been made contingent on legislative

123. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229-35 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that procedural protection should accompany grievous losses of freedom); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 587-92 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that procedural
protections should accompany the loss of a governmentjob).
124. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-78.
125. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985) (holding that an
entitlement may be created even if a legislature does not provide for procedural protection).
126. Herman, The New Liberty, supra note 121, at 552-55.
127. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (providing that particular
requirements of due process depend on a balancing test).
128.

U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

129.

See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (holding that two offenses

are not the "same" if each requires proof of a fact that the other does not).

130. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 359 (1983) (holding that the legislature has
discretion to decide how many offenses to create).
131. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
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decisions. Any legislature can either avoid the provision of counsel by
making a particular offense punishable only by fine, or create the conditions
under which an indigent defendant will be entitled to assigned counsel by
providing for punishment by incarceration. 32 Similarly, the Sixth
Amendment right to trial byjury springs into being only if the legislature has
decided that the offense in question is punishable by incarceration of six
133
months or more.
This positivist technique for defining rights works better in some areas
than in others. The Sixth Amendment cases are based on a simple and
appealing logic: if a defendant is not subject to a particularly onerous
punishment, then the availability of full-scale procedures like the right to
counsel and right to jury trial is less consequential. The legislature can
eliminate an individual's opportunity to be tried by ajury or to have counsel
assigned only by actually reducing the defendant's exposure to punishment.
The legislative decision to impose a lesser punishment automatically reduces
the need for expensive procedural protections.
With respect to the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses, however,
I have argued that logic does not support the Court's approach, and that the
Court is simply being too deferential to its legislative partners.'TM For
example, if a prisoner is denied parole in a state where positive law has
created criteria for parole release, that prisoner has a constitutional right to
have the parole decision made with due process. 3 5 But a prisoner who has
been denied parole in a state where no criteria have been announced will
not be entitled to notice, an opportunity to be heard, or even reasons for a
decision denying parole, even if that prisoner has just as many years of
freedom at stake.136 Ironically, states willing to be careless about such
decisions are allowed the freedom to make their own decisions about what
process to offer, while states that try to regularize their decision-making

132. See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the right to
assigned counsel attaches in misdemeanor cases involving possibility of incarceration); Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (finding that the right to assigned counsel attaches only when
defendant has actually had a sentence of incarceration imposed).
133. Baldwin v. NewYork, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970).
134. Herman, The New Liberty, supra note 121, at 543-75; Susan N. Herman, Autrefois Double
Jeopardy, THE JURIST, Jun. 1999 (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE
HISTORY, THE LAw (1998)); see also Susan R Klein, DoubleJeopardy'sDemise, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1001,
1002 (2000) (agreeing that the Court has been too deferential in its Double Jeopardy cases).
Other commentators have approved of this level of deference to the legislature. See THOMAS,
supra, at 6, 272-75 (arguing for total deference to legislative intent in Double Jeopardy Clause
cases); Nancy J. King, PortioningPunishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive
Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 114, 126-49 (1995) (espousing a similar approach).
135. SeeGreenholtzv. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979)
(finding germane limitations on discretion to grant parole in the structure and language of the
Nebraska law).
136. See Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that a New York parole
statute creates no liberty interest).
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thereby subject their procedural decisions to an extra layer of federal court
scrutiny.
The Court seems willing to assume that political accountability
nevertheless will lead legislatures to make sensible determinations about
what decisions are important enough to warrant the costs of process, even if
legislatures cannot be trusted to provide for the expensive process itself.
Unfortunately, legislatures are least likely to create an entitlement in exactly
those cases where politically powerless people are most in need of judicial
solicitude. In fact, welfare recipients and prisoners have
borne the brunt of
37
the Court's deferentially positivistic due process law.1
The holding of Apprendi, like these positivist cases, asks how each
legislature arrays its statutory maximum punishments, and then makes the
resulting procedural rights depend on the answer to that question. This
approach shares both the theory and the flaws of the prior cases.
In prison due process cases like Meachum v. Fano,'38 the Court adopted
the view that once a person has been convicted, that person has no "liberty"
interest for the maximum period of time provided by the statute of
conviction.1 3 9 From that definitional starting point, the Court has reasoned
that if the state wishes to consider giving back some portion of that forfeited
liberty, in the form of parole or a lesser sentence, that decision is a matter of
grace, and does not necessitate procedural rights. 14 0 I have previously
explained why this highly positivist treatment of an individual's freedom is
misguided.
Apprendi's formal holding seems to rest on the same
assumption-that once a defendant has been convicted under one
particular statute, the government is entitled to claim the maximum number
of years of incarceration designated in that statute, and need not provide
any particular process for a sentencing judge to follow in deciding whether
to "give back" a part of that time. According to the holding of Apprendi, it is
only when two different statutes are involved that the government increases
the prosecutor's "entitlement" and therefore must provide the process
appropriate to initial deprivations of liberty, including jury fact-finding and a
heightened standard of proof.
Relying on this highly formalistic approach to decide when defendants
must be afforded trial process is just as problematic here as it is in the
procedural due process cases, where the safeguards of freedom also depend
on the geography of statutes. The Apprendi holding shares with the
procedural due process cases the consequence of allowing the legislature to
eliminate rights simply by wording their statutes or regulations cannily, as
137. Herman, The New Liberty, supra note 121, at 533-43, 554.
138. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
139. Id. at 224.
140. Chief Justice Rehnquist explicitly described the McMillan holding as resting on this
positivist theory. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 n.8 (1986).
141. Herman, The New Liberty, supranote 121, at 528-63.
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Justice O'Connor suggested.14 2 That this rewriting is so easy to accomplish,
and so cost-free to the legislature, suggests that the distinction the Court has
drawn so far is not a very meaningful one.
Justice Stevens's speculation that the transparency of legislative
14 3
decisions after Apprendi will provide a political check on bad decisions is at
odds with his own earlier recognition that political accountability is no more
likely to protect criminal defendants in this area than it is to protect welfare
recipients and prisoners.'" The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide a
perfect example of legislative neglect, leaving enormously consequential
fact-finding decisions concerning defendants' punishment to sentencing
judges operating on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt'
As in the procedural due process cases, if the Court limits itself to the
narrow holding in Apprendi, the Court will be declining to make its own
decisions about the value of freedom or the value of process. This
deferential posture blithely ignores the fact that political accountability is
not likely to provide an effective safeguard in a context where the people
figures. 46
whose freedom is at stake, like Charles Apprendi, are unpopular
But unlike some of the other cases espousing a positivist approach,
Apprendi's attempt to share decision-making authority with the legislature
has no compelling logic behind it. Unlike the Sixth Amendment cases
described previously, legislative decisions about the geography of statutes do
not affect a defendant's exposure to punishment. A defendant faces the
same potential loss of freedom regardless of whether the choice of sentence
is contained within one statutory maximum or spread over two. Unlike
decisions about how heavily to punish certain conduct or what conduct
should be criminalized, a legislative decision to create one statutory
maximum rather than two does not reflect the type of policy decision about
criminal justice philosophy that legislatures need to be allowed to make.
Unlike the double jeopardy cases, the legislature is not making a decision to

142.
143.
144.

Supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
Supra text accompanying note 108.
McMWUan, 477 U.S. at 95, 101-102 (Stevens,J., dissenting).

145.

It is ironic that Stevens, probably for the sake of cobbling together a majority, became

an apologist for the positivist view of liberty, because in his dissenting opinion in McMillan he
maintained that appropriate due process protections should be afforded whenever a decision

ill increase either the stigma or the level of punishment involved, regardless of the maximum
penalty provided by statute. Id. at 103; see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 231-32 (1976)
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that any grievous loss of a prisoner's freedom should trigger
some measure of procedural protection under the Due Process Clause). Neither the majority
nor dissenting opinions in McMUllanand Meachum discuss the right to trial byjury.
146. Convicted felons are at the nadir of political power as they may literally be
disenfranchised. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56 (1974) (holding that California
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by disenfranchising convicted felons even after they
had completed their sentences and paroles).
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create two different offenses. 147 Instead, the legislature is essentially grading
one offense and then deciding whether to have the aggravating factors
decided by judge orjury.
This legislative decision has no bearing on the question of what
decisions jurors can or should be making, either as a historical or a
functional matter. A better application of the hybrid rights approach might
be to ask some variant of the question suggested above: has the legislature
adopted a legitimate sentencing philosophy that requires deferring factual
decisions to sentencing and, perhaps, confiding those decisions to judges?
As it stands, Apprendi, with its focus on the layout of statutes, draws a line to
explain where legislatures will receive deference and where they will not. But
the line is difficult to defend, except as an outright compromise.
C. DuE PROCEssAND PROOFBEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
Even when a court allows a legislature to assign a significant offenserelated factual finding to the sentencing judge, the question remains
whether the Due Process Clause requires the judge to employ the same
careful procedures that apply at trial, including the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. I have argued elsewhere that the assumption
that informal procedures are appropriately employed at sentencing is a
holdover from the more "traditional" sentencing hearings held under
indeterminate sentencing regimes. 14 Where judges enjoy complete
sentencing discretion, their factual decisions at sentencing might concern
how best to rehabilitate a defendant and, therefore, might entail hearing
from witnesses testifying about the defendant's childhood, diagnosis, and
prognosis. Formal rules of evidence and a heightened standard of proof
might indeed be inappropriate at a sentencing hearing where a judge is
hearing testimony relevant to a predictive sentencing decision, including
testimony concerning the offender's history or prognosis.149 However, the
factual decisions on which a sentence is based under the Guidelines
generally concern the offense itself, including the offender's role in the
events in question.
Rules of evidence are not ill-suited to determine the quantity of drugs
involved in a defendant's offense, and they are no less worthwhile than at
trial when, in either case, years of a person's freedom may depend on this
factual determination. If conviction of any drug crime, no matter how small
the sentence imposed, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, why
shouldn't a decision about the quantity of drugs involved, which can
147. According to Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), distinct offenses exist
only when each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, so cumulative
offenses are considered, for constitutional purposes, to be the "same offense." Id.at 304.
148. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog,supranote 48, at 307-09, 314-16.
149. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949) (maintaining that judicial
discretion at sentencing needs to be broad).
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increase a sentence by years or even decades, be treated just as seriously?
The narrowed focus of attention under both the Sentencing Reform Act and
the Guidelines could and should have led to a minimization of the
difference between the procedures offered at trial, where some of the facts
concerning the offense are found, and at sentencing, where other similar
facts concerning that same offense are found. This did not happen, because
under the positivist theory described above, the defendant is viewed as
having already forfeited the maximum amount of liberty upon conviction.
This legal fiction has compromised the freedom of people who are not
favored by legislatures for long enough.
III. CONCLUSION

While some commentators express impatience with Apprendi's focus on
the jury, I think that Justice Scalia is correct in asserting that the
determinative issue here is the extent to which the courts will preserve or
reinstate the power of juries-the other form of political accountability.
Instead of speculating or engaging in wishful thinking about what
legislatures will do, or whether political accountability will lead to sound
legislative decisions, the Court could take the revolutionary approach of
holding legislatures, prosecutors, and even judges accountable by
empowering juries. Such an approach would not be a new revolution, but a
continuation of the one that started in the eighteenth century.
My guess is that the Supreme Court, still caught in the grip of a
positivist view of the liberty of convicted people and susceptible to the
dissenters' call for legislative deference and laissez-faire federalism, will likely
agree with the courts of appeals that Apprendi's formalistic holding should
represent the doctrine's outer limits. But if the Court expands Apprend's
holding to meet its rationale, it will be because the Justices are more
attracted by the romantic image of juries as a locus of democratic action
than by Justice Breyer's antirevolutionary pragmatism. If the Court does
apply Apprendi to the Guidelines, defense attorneys who have argued for that
expansion may relearn the truth of the old adage that one must be careful
what one wishes for. Is the empowerment of juries worth the risk to
defendants? Will the Court continue the revolution? I will give Lennon and
McCartney the last word:
You say you want a revolution...
You say you'll change the Constitution...
You say you've got a real solution,
Well, you know,
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We'd all love to see the plan...
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